Venezuela is converted into a submissive junior partner of the Trump regime

By YUSEF RAMIREZ

The United States invaded Venezuela after months of building up military forces in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific and carrying out illegal attacks on fishing boats. U.S. special forces kidnapped Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, in an operation that decapitated the Chavista regime with relative ease. The invasion of Venezuela signaled to Latin America and the world that the United States intended to implement its “Donroe Doctrine,” under which the U.S. declared its dominance over Latin America.

The United States chose Delcy Rodríguez, then vice president under Nicolás Maduro, to govern the nation. A month after taking power, Delcy Rodríguez pushed through a fundamental change in the country’s energy policy. The Venezuelan government amended the Chavista law that limited foreign companies’ control over the country’s oil. Under the Organic Hydrocarbons Law, transnational energy corporations could exercise control over production, sales, and energy prices without collaborating with PDVSA, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, under which Chávez had nationalized the oil industry in 2006.

The law also changed the legal framework for resolving industrial disputes, shifting them from Venezuelan courts to international courts, which in practice further reduced the Venezuelan state’s power over its oil. And to continue securing foreign investors, the Hydrocarbons Law also reduced royalties for foreign companies to a maximum of 30%, with the possibility of lowering them to 15%.

Alongside the Organic Hydrocarbons Law, we must also consider the Organic Mining Law. The Venezuelan legislature approved it in April 2026. Like the energy legislation, the Organic Mining Law eliminates the state’s exclusive right to exploit gold and rare earth minerals and opens these resources to foreign companies. This came as an order from the White House, which needs to secure supplies of these minerals to reduce its dependence on China, which controls the world’s most important rare earth reserves, essential to the technology industry.

The Venezuelan government imposed these privatization laws under the threat of U.S. military force, paving the way for the expansion of foreign exploitation of Venezuela’s natural resources and political domination over its institutions. Just months after this reform, the Trump administration used it to consolidate U.S. control over Venezuela’s oil industry.

Following secret negotiations conducted behind the backs of the Venezuelan legislature, Delcy Rodríguez signed an agreement on Sept. 2, 2026, with the U.S. government and its energy-sector masters, handing over Venezuela’s oil reserves in a historic deal. Under the agreement, the United States obtained control over nearly a quarter of these resources, control over the profits from their production, and exploitation rights for 100 years. The handover will take place under the supervision of North American Blue Energy Partners, with U.S. administrators and lawyers managing operations on Venezuelan soil.

Despite Delcy Rodríguez’s nationalist rhetoric, this historic agreement will increase Venezuela’s semicolonial dependence on the United States. Not only does it grant the U.S. control over 25% of the country’s most important resource for a century, but it also demonstrates Delcy Rodríguez’s willingness to reach such agreements without the slightest involvement of her own institutions, much less consultation with the masses.

Furthermore, the development of Venezuela’s oil industry—devastated by years of U.S. sanctions and state corruption—will require U.S. technology and management. Technological dependence is a key mechanism through which imperialism controls the industries of oppressed countries and a fundamental obstacle to developing a national economy that meets the needs of its own people.

Although some on the international left argue that this energy agreement is a necessary concession by the Venezuelan state to defend its “socialist revolution,” the reality is entirely the opposite. This agreement benefits the U.S. economy and political interests and their junior partners in the Venezuelan bourgeoisie. The masses, on the other hand, will continue to suffer from precarious living conditions, unemployment, and repression—conditions that have driven a quarter of the population to flee the country over the past decade.

There was never a socialist revolution under Chavismo. The working class did not overthrow the Venezuelan capitalist state when Chávez came to power in 1998; it did not expropriate private and foreign property and place it under the democratic control of workers, nor did it break with the extractivist economic model in which Venezuela depends on selling oil on the international market. The right-wing, white bourgeoisie that had governed Venezuela in previous decades ceded ground to a new “Boliburguesía”—the new bourgeoisie that emerged from the Chavista “Bolivarian Revolution”—but it was never removed from power by a mass revolution.

Ultimately, Delcy Rodríguez’s actions represent a continuation of Chavista policies. Chavismo was a movement within a sector of the Venezuelan armed forces that used the social discontent generated by neoliberalism to propel itself into power and renegotiate—not eliminate—the dependence of its economy on international oil prices. By nationalizing oil and other key industries, Chávez strengthened the role of the capitalist state in relation to transnational corporations. But oil nationalization is not, in itself, a revolutionary or socialist act; previous Venezuelan governments had implemented it during the 20th century in accordance with their political interests and the balance of forces with imperialism.

The Venezuelan state, for example, began playing a more active role in the oil industry in the 1920s, when it imposed royalties on the production and sale of hydrocarbons. When the Democratic Action party (Acción Democrática) came to power following a military coup in 1945, the new state increased its share to 50% of the wealth generated by oil extraction. This policy was reflected in other oil-rich states, such as Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, which took advantage of high energy demand during the boom in the automobile industry. In 1958, under another civilian-military government, Venezuela increased state control to 65%, and in 1980 the state declared that 80% of oil concessions would come under state control when their contracts expired.

Chávez’s energy policies continued, under a new context, the tradition of bourgeois nationalist policies aimed at strengthening the capitalist state against imperialist pressure over national oil resources. Reversing what had been a process of energy denationalization and privatization during the 1990s, Hugo Chávez’s government began a process of oil renationalization in 2006. Under the new laws, the state-owned oil company PDVSA would control a minimum of 50% of investment projects with foreign companies such as Chevron, BP, and Total Oil, all of which accepted these conditions. ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were the only companies that rejected them and were expropriated by the state. In other words, energy exploitation by multinational corporations continued, but with more active participation by the Chavista state.

Furthermore, Chávez sought closer relations with China, which lent Venezuela approximately $100 billion between 2000 and 2023 in exchange for oil exports to China. Chávez initiated a relationship of dependence on Chinese imperialism; though the connection is uncertain since the U.S. invasion, Venezuela’s debt to China is still between $10–15 billion in 2026. However much China tries to portray itself as an ally of oppressed countries and a progressive alternative to Western imperialism, it is nothing more than another imperialist power, albeit a relatively new and rising one, which has grown through the brutal exploitation of Chinese, Asian, African, and Latin American workers.

The surge in international oil prices between 2004 and 2014 brought greater state revenues to Venezuela. Through these revenues, the Venezuelan bourgeoisie enriched itself, although Chávez’s government also implemented social programs in housing, food, education, infrastructure, and other areas, improving the living conditions of millions of Venezuelans. But oil prices began falling in 2014, generating an economic crisis and initiating a process of neoliberal adjustments, privatizations, and repression against the working class.

Following Hugo Chávez’s death in 2013, Nicolás Maduro took the reins of power. Because Chavismo had never diversified the economy to meet the needs of its people, changes in international energy prices drastically reduced the country’s main source of revenue. As in any capitalist state, Nicolás Maduro placed the burden of this crisis on the shoulders of the working class. The famous social programs were stripped of funding: subsidies for health care, medicine, and food plummeted. The Chavista bourgeoisie used the oil revenues that continued flowing in from abroad to pay the external debt, strengthen the armed forces, and enrich itself through blatant corruption. During this period, private capital fueled a massive flight of capital, draining the country of resources, financial assets, and technology. Changes in international markets, the commitment to servicing the external debt, corruption, and capital flight all contributed to an economic crisis that threatened the foundations of Chavista power and the living conditions of the masses.

U.S. sanctions imposed by Trump during his first term in 2017 worsened the situation because they prohibited the restructuring of Venezuela’s debt and threatened sanctions against countries that traded with Venezuela. Sanctions targeting  oil sales to China and India were particularly impactful because those two countries imported much of the energy exports previously destined for the United States. The United States froze the assets of the state oil company, PDVSA, and imposed a total ban on Venezuelan oil imports into the U.S. market. Washington’s objective was to strangle the Venezuelan economy and bring about the downfall of Nicolás Maduro’s government.

Without the social programs that had legitimized the Chavista government, the state resorted to state terror to control popular sectors. It is estimated that during this period, the state committed 20% of all homicides in the country, precisely during a wave of mass protests against repression and the rising cost of living. Under the pretext of combating organized crime, the Chavista state under Maduro deployed its armed forces and paramilitary groups to unleash a wave of terror against working-class neighborhoods, not unlike the urban warfare seen in Brazil, Mexico, and other parts of Latin America.

In recent weeks, the Venezuelan government has been implementing policies that expose the capitalist and semicolonial character of its rule. In late October 2026, Delcy Rodríguez announced that her government would privatize companies in “non-essential” sectors and return them to their former owners. The president stated that private property was “guaranteed by the Constitution” but assured the public that “sovereignty is not negotiable; we cooperate with everyone, but we make our own decisions in Venezuela.” Although the Venezuelan state maintains a certain presence in industries such as agriculture, telecommunications, and tourism, it has not specified which companies will be privatized. This law is part of a package of promised changes that include new elections administered by a new National Electoral Council—different from the one that oversaw the last elections—respect for democratic rights, and a wage increase.

Also in late October, the Venezuelan military carried out an airstrike against the National Liberation Forces (Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional), a Colombian guerrilla group operating inside Venezuela that was accused of drug trafficking and acting as a paramilitary army for Nicolás Maduro. This accusation has been used countless times by the U.S. military and its allies in Latin America to cover up the killings and massacres of innocent civilians in order to displace them from their resource-rich lands. It is no coincidence that this attack is taking place as the United States has secured the right to exploit Venezuela’s rare earth minerals; with this attack, it is signaling its intention to eliminate the competition.

In June, the United States provided weapons and intelligence to assassinate an alleged leader of the Tren de Aragua organization. This is part of a plan for the long-term presence of American troops on Venezuelan territory, the details of which the United States and Delcy Rodríguez are negotiating.

It was precisely at this moment that María Corina Machado, the leading figure of Venezuela’s pro-U.S. right wing, arrived. Her return after a year in exile was accompanied by mass demonstrations—larger than those of the Chavista sector—which Machado hopes to use to consolidate a base of support and accelerate the elections she expects will bring her to power. When Maduro fell, Trump dismissed the idea of promoting Machado as the country’s new leader because of her inability to displace Chavismo in previous elections. Her return to Venezuela is taking place within the framework of U.S. political control, which seeks to manage an electoral process without generating political chaos that could threaten its investment projects. Within this context, Chavismo and the traditional Venezuelan right are negotiating the end of the Chavista era.

The Trump administration has chosen to secure its economic interests in Venezuela before supporting a “return to democracy,” disproving its claims of supporting a process of democratic reform. For now, the Chavista state without Maduro has served it quite well. It will have to manage María Corina Machado’s ambitions and her support base in Venezuela and the United States in accordance with its desire for the colonial stability that suits Trump.

The policies of Delcy’s government reflect a regime submissive to Yankee imperialism. Chávez and Maduro governed Venezuela under different circumstances, but both maintained the country’s dependence on the dictates of the international market, policies of containment and repression of the working class, and a neoliberal extractivist economy that enriched the local bourgeoisie and its imperialist masters while impoverishing the masses and destroying the environment. Delcy’s government, following the U.S. invasion, preserves this character of Venezuelan capitalism, with deeper penetration by U.S. imperialism alongside a significant retreat of state power over the economy.

Privatizations in key sectors, control over the political process, and joint military actions in Venezuela are being carried out by the same Chavista state that governed for three decades. Instead of organizing popular resistance, the Venezuelan state easily capitulated and became a submissive junior partner of the U.S. pirates. Sooner or later, Chavismo was bound to have made this decision; it was only a matter of time. Although it increased state control over the economy in early 2006, the enslavement of its economy to the international capitalist market and the Boliburguesía’s thirst for profits would inevitably invite privatization, repression, and, when the time was right, total capitulation to imperialism.

The task of socialists is to defend the right of the Venezuelan masses to decide their own future without imperialist domination. At the same time, it is essential that our anti-imperialist solidarity with Venezuela remain firmly on the side of that country’s workers and oppressed.

Photo: Delcy Rodríguez and Donald Trump pose together while meeting in New York in late September. (AFP / Getty Images)

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